A standard problem in operations literature is optimal stocking of substitutable products. We consider a very general consumer-driven substitution problem with an arbitrary number of products and a quite general substitution structure, both under centralized inventory management and competition. We obtain analytically tractable solutions that generalize and extend the results of several earlier papers in this area and also lead to new results.
Introduction
This paper examines the optimal inventory stocking policies for a given product line under the notion that consumers who do not¯nd their¯rst-choice product in the current inventory might substitute a similar product for it (consumer-directed substitution). We consider consumer-directed substitution in a quite general form. Namely, there is an arbitrary number of products and each consumer has a¯rst-choice product. If this product is out of stock, the consumer might choose one of the other products as a substitute. If the second-choice product is not available, the sale is lost.
This form of substitution appears to be the most commonly studied in the literature. We use a single-period formulation with demand for products following an arbitrary continuous multivariate distribution.
The relevant papers can be divided into two main categories { non-competitive and competitive.
We study both of these categories within one uni¯ed framework. We will only give a brief summary of relevant literature. For a more comprehensive survey of research on demand substitution, the reader is referred to Mahajan and van Ryzin [9] . Signi¯cant research has been done in the area of consumer-directed substitution. Nevertheless, only modest progress has been made in terms of proving uniqueness and characterizing a solution for the problems with more than two substitutable products. McGillivray and Silver [10] started the stream of research on consumer-directed substitution in the non-competitive case and their work was extended by Parlar and Goyal [14] , Ernst and Kouvelis [3] , Rajaram and Tang [16] , Noonan [13] and Anupindi et.al. [2] . All these papers use formulations similar to ours. Smith and Agrawal [19] , Agrawal and Smith [1] , Mahajan and van Ryzin [7] and van Ryzin and Mahajan [18] provide more elaborate models of the consumer choice process. Parlar [15] was the¯rst to address consumer-directed substitution under competition.
Other work in this stream includes Wang and Parlar [22] , Karjalainen [5] , Lippman and McCardle [6] and Mahajan and van Ryzin [8] , with the¯rst three papers addressing scenarios similar to ours and the latter two formulating more complex models.
Our contribution for the non-competitive substitution problem is a tractable analytical solution for an arbitrary number of products, general multivariate demand distribution, and general cost and revenue parameters. The majority of the previous authors obtained the solution by using the wellknown Leibnitz formula. We employ an alternative technique for taking derivatives based on the de¯nition of the derivative that allows us to obtain a compact solution that generalizes and simpli¯es results obtained by previous authors. We also show that for more than two products the objective function might not be quasi-concave. This result shows that the previous¯ndings demonstrating concavity for two substitutable products are not readily generalizable to problems with more than two products. Finally, we show that if demand follows a multivariate Normal distribution, the retailer's pro¯t is a decreasing function of demand correlation when stocking quantities are either held¯xed or adjusted optimally as correlation increases. This result has been shown numerically by Rajaram and Tang [16] and Ernst and Kouvelis [3] but, to the best of our knowledge, has never been proven analytically. For the competitive substitution problem, we derive analytical expressions for the best response functions, allowing us to prove the uniqueness and global stability of the Nash equilibrium. These results enhance the literature where uniqueness of the equilibrium was only proven for two products by Parlar [15] and for a symmetric problem by Lippman and McCardle [6] . We also analytically characterize the Nash equilibrium by the expressions that are amenable to analysis and comparisons. Finally, we show that if demand follows the multivariate Normal distribution, each players' pro¯t is a decreasing function of demand correlation when stocking quantities are held¯xed. A non-intuitive result is the¯nding that competition might lead to understocking some of the substitutable products as compared to the centralized solution. This nding partly contradicts a widely acknowledged result that competition leads to overstocking of all products.
Analysis
We consider the problem with n products indexed by i = 1; : : : ; n o®ered for sale in a single period.
At the beginning of the period, Q i units of product i are stocked at a unit cost c i and sold at unit price r i . We assume that leftover inventory is salvaged at the end of the period at unit salvage value s i . We also make the following assumption that is standard for newsvendor-type problems: P n j=1 a ij < 1, of the demand for product i will buy product j (if available) as a substitute in case product i is out of stock (where a ii = 0 for all i). If the consumer's second-choice product is also out of stock, the sale is lost. We will consider two alternative models. In the centralized model, all n products are managed by a single company.
In the de-centralized (competitive) model, each product is managed by a separate company. Let ¼ denote the company's pro¯t under centralization and ¼ i denote the company i's pro¯t under competition. De¯ne x + = max(0; x).
Centralized inventory management
The expression for the expected pro¯t consists of three parts: revenue, acquisition cost and salvage value for each product:
De¯ne
+ , where the superscript s indicates that the e®ect from substitution has been accounted for. In words, D s i is the sum of the demand from¯rst-choice consumers and substituting consumers. It is conventional to de¯ne u i = r i ¡ c i , the unit underage cost; and o i = c i ¡s i , the unit overage cost. By algebraic manipulation and collecting similar terms, we get:
Notice that D s i depends on the stocking quantities of the other products (i.e. Q j for j 6 = i). While for the simple newsvendor problem minimizing the expected opportunity cost is equivalent to maximizing expected pro¯t, it follows that this is not the case under substitution because the expected pro¯t under \perfect information" (i.e. the¯rst term of (1)) depends on the decision variables. For certain problem parameters, Parlar and Goyal [14] demonstrated that the objective function in the case of two products is jointly concave. Ernst and Kouvelis [3] showed that the problem with three partially substitutable products is jointly concave as well. However, we will verify analytically and through numerical experiments that the objective function with more than two products and full substitution structure might not be concave and not even quasiconcave. To see this, consider the deterministic analog of the problem. We will show that the deterministic objective function,1, may not be concave in at least one of the decision variables. The objective function can be re-written as follows:
Now hold Q j ; j 6 = i¯xed and consider the slope of the objective function for di®erent values of Q i .
1:
Term (2) rises at a rate (u i +o i ): Term (3) rises at a rate between 0 and
Terms (4) and (5) decrease at rates P j6 =i a ij (u j + o j ) and o i ; correspondingly. Hence, on this interval the slope of the objective function is between u i ¡ P j6 =i a ij (u j + o j ) and u i :
Term (2) rises at a rate (u i + o i ) and term (5) decreases at a rate o i . Hence, on this interval the slope of the objective function is u i :
Term (5) decreases at a rate o i : Hence, on this interval the slope of the objective function is ¡o i .
We can now plot the objective function. If u i > P j6 =i a ij (u j + o j ) then the objective function is quasiconcave (Figure 1 left) . Otherwise, the objective function might actually be bi-modal ( This deterministic counter-example of non-concavity also works when demand distribution has very low variability. We veri¯ed that this is the case through numerical experiments (see Figure 2 , left, for example of the objective function. We use Normal distribution with mean 100 and standard deviation of 1). Although it appears through our derivation that as long as u i > P j6 =i a ij (u j +o j ) the objective function should be unimodal in each of the decision variables (but not necessarily jointly), we were unable to verify this result analytically. Moreover, we found that for any reasonable demand Through a variety of numerical experiments with Normal, uniform, and bi-modal demand distributions we veri¯ed that the solution is unique for any reasonable problem parameters. Note, however, that all our subsequent results do not rely on concavity in any way: they hold for any solution (in case there are multiple local maxima) since all of the solutions will satisfy the¯rst-order conditions.
Since the objective function might not be concave,¯rst-order optimality conditions have to be used together with second-order conditions. We will now obtain optimality condition. Taking derivatives using Leibnitz' formula is di±cult for this problem due to the necessity of dealing with nested integrals of high dimensionality over regions formed by intersections of a large number of hyperplanes. This problem has been acknowledged by some authors of the earlier work on demand substitution (see Noonan [13] ). Also, solutions obtained with Leibnitz' formula are quite cumbersome with little analytical structure. We, however, utilize an alternative technique described in Rudi [17] . The main idea of this technique is that we use the de¯nition of the derivative to di®erentiate the objective function.
Proposition 1
The optimality conditions of the centralized problem are given by
i = 1; :::; n, where Q c i denotes the optimal order quantity for product i. Proof: Recall that the derivative of a function g(x) w.r.t. variable x is de¯ned as follows:
" :
We will demonstrate how this de¯nition can be used to obtain a derivative for one term in the objective function:
The other terms can be analyzed in a similar way. The derivative of this term can be expressed as:
The derivative of the¯rst term can easily be taken using the Leibnitz formula so we will demonstrate how to¯nd the derivative of the second term. We have for an arbitrary j 6 = i
where the numerator can be expressed as
We then obtain
Applying the technique to all terms results in the following expression of the derivative of (1) with respect to Q i :
Equating to zero and rearranging gives the desired result. This completes the proof. 2 Expression (7) has an intuitive interpretation that in part parallels Noonan's [13] intuition. Without the second and third terms on the left-hand side, the expression becomes the solution to the simple newsvendor problem that does not anticipate substitution. Further, the optimal order quantity of product i is adjusted up (the second term on the left-hand side) for the extra demand due to substitution. On the other hand, the optimal order quantity is also adjusted down due to the possibility that a stock-out of product i might not necessarily result in a lost sale but might instead result in substitution. We see that the simple newsvendor solution is generally not optimal when consumers might substitute if their¯rst-choice product is out of stock. From the second term on the left-hand side of (7) it follows that, the higher the degree of substitution to product i (i.e. large a ji ), the more one would expect to order of product i (i.e. Q i ). Further, from the third term on the left-hand side of (7) it follows that, the higher the degree of substitution from product i (i.e. 
To use this result, it must be shown that the retailer's objective function is supermodular in D for each demand realization. Instead, we will show that the objective function is submodular for each demand realization and later use the fact that if f (x) is submodular then ¡f(x) is supermodular. To prove this, we need to show that the following function is submodular in D
The last term does not depend on the D i s and hence can be ignored. Further, a sum of submodular functions is a submodular function, and hence it su±ces to prove submodularity for each term under the summation sign. Notice that the following function
+ is a valuation (see page 43 in Topkis [21] ), i.e. it is both submodular and supermodular. This is a consequence of the fact that this function is separable in the D i 's. Table 1 in Topkis [20] shows that if f (x) is a concave increasing function and h(D) is submodular, then f(h(D)) is also submodular. Clearly, f (x) = min(x; Q i ) is concave and increasing in x so that f (D) = min(h(D); Q i ) is submodular in D and hence ¼(D) is submodular. We are now ready to prove thē nal result. We are interested in the full di®erential of the objective function w.r.t. correlation, i.e.
If we hold the Qs¯xed then @Q k =@½ = 0: Similarly, if we change the Qs optimally, then @¼=@Q k = 0.
Hence, under our assumptions d¼=d½ ij = @¼=@½ ij : Finally, by Muller and Scarsini [12] , if
This completes the proof. 2
De-centralized inventory management
We will now look at the alternative model where a separate company controls the stocking policy of each product. Firm i's optimal decision will then depend on the vector of inventory levels of the other¯rms denoted by Q ¡i . Let the expected pro¯t of¯rm i given the other¯rms' decisions be
We have
Note that the demand distribution is a function of the order quantities of the other¯rms. Hence, a game theoretic situation arises where¯rm i will employ the best response, de¯ned as follows: the
This best response will be denoted by Q d i´B r i (Q ¡i ): Given Q ¡i it is easy to verify that ¼ i is concave in Q i . To obtain the best response, we take the derivative of ¼ i with respect to Q i :
The best response is then characterized by the familiar expression:
Proposition 3 Any Nash equilibrium is characterized by the following optimality conditions:
; i = 1; :::; n:
The explanation is as follows: the simple newsvendor quantity is adjusted up by the second term on the left-hand side in order to account for extra demand from substituting consumers. Notice that the di®erence between the non-competitive solution (7) and the competitive solution (10) is that the order quantity is not adjusted down since a consumer who comes for the product i and does not¯nd it is lost for the company. We see again that the simple newsvendor solution is suboptimal.
Moreover, the competitive solution is suboptimal in terms of the system pro¯t, since it does not account for the advantage in the case that a stock-out might lead to additional sales of a substitute product (i.e. the third term of the optimality condition for the centralized case (7)). Due to this e®ect, we expect to stock more under competition than in the centralized case. From the second term on the left-hand side of (10) it follows that, the higher the degree of substitution to a product i (i.e. large a ji ), the more one would order of product i (i.e. Q i ). Contrary to the centralized case, however, a higher degree of substitution from a product i (i.e. large a ij ) does not have a direct e®ect on the order quantity of product i (i.e. Q i ).
A Nash equilibrium is de¯ned as a strategy from which it will not be bene¯cial for any of the players to deviate. We establish the following result:
Proposition 4 A Nash equilibrium exists in the competitive case and can be found from the¯rst order conditions (10) . Further, if either P n i=1 a ij < 1 for all j, or P n j=1 a ij < 1 for all i, the Nash equilibrium is unique and globally stable.
Proof: Existence of the equilibrium was demonstrated by Lippman and McCardle [6] . We then proceed to prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium using the contraction mapping principle.
It is straightforward to verify that the second derivative of i's objective function is negative, and hence each objective function is concave in the order quantity. It follows that each best response function is single-valued and, given the order quantities of all other players, the unique best response of each player can then be found from the¯rst order conditions. Consider the following system of equations: Q d i = Br i (Q ¡i ); i = 1; :::; n. This system is a R n ! R n mapping. In order to conclude that it has a unique solution, it is su±cient to prove that this mapping is a contraction (see Moulin [11] ). To show that the mapping is a contraction, it is su±cient to demonstrate that the spectral radius (denoted by ½) of the Jacobian of the mapping is bounded by one, i.e. ½(J Br ) < 1.
Using Theorem 5.6.9 from Horn and Johnson [4] , the spectral radius of the matrix is bounded by any of the matrix norms, i.e. ½(J Br ) · kJ Br k. By using maximum column sum (one-norm) and maximum row sum (in¯nity-norm) matrix norms, we can show that the proposition holds if either P n i=1 a ij < 1 for all j or P n j=1 a ij < 1 for all i. We only consider the case of the maximum column sum norm here, since the case of the maximum row sum norm follows by transposing the Jacobian.
The maximum column sum norm is de¯ned as:
Each element for the Jacobian J ij = @Br i =@Q j ; i 6 = j; J ii = 0; i; j = 1; :::; n represents the slope of a best response function. In order to obtain entries of the Jacobian we will employ implicit di®erentiation. The slope of the best response function is:
where f X is the density function of the random variable X . It is easy to see that the best response function Br i (Q ¡i ) is monotonic and the slope is between 0 and a ji in absolute value. The spectral radius of the Jacobian is bounded above as follows:
Hence, the best response mapping is a contraction, and correspondingly it has a unique, globally stable¯xed point that is the Nash equilibrium of the game. 2
In the case of competition and a multivariate Normal demand distribution, each players' pro¯t decreases as correlation rises, but only when all stocking quantities are kept¯xed. [6] for some special cases. A similar conclusion follows from the fact that, in the centralized solution, the newsvendor inventory level for product i is adjusted up to account for consumers switching to product i, and adjusted down to account for consumers switching from product i. Meanwhile, in the de-centralized solution, the inventory level is only adjusted up. Nevertheless, we provide a counter-example illustrating that there are situations when the inventory level for at least one product will be higher in the non-competitive solution than in the competitive.
Proposition 6
The following relationships between Q (ii) It is always true that Q c i · Q d i for at least one i.
(iii) Suppose that all the costs and revenues are symmetric among¯rms, demands are independent and identically distributed, and consumers are equally likely to switch to any of the (N ¡ 1) products, i.e. a ij = a < 1 N¡1 for all i; j. Then Q c i · Q d i for all i.
Proof:
(i) The proof is by counter-example. First, consider the centralized solution. Suppose for some product i, D i = 0 and a ij = 0, for all j. Hence, the stocking policy for product i depends solely on the demand from the consumers switching to product i from other products and
. Note that in this situation (7) looks like (10) . Next, we turn to the same scenario but in the de-centralized setting. Assume that Q c j · Q d j for all j 6 = i (otherwise the counter-example is complete). Hence, demand for product i, D s i is stochastically smaller resulting in a decrease in the stocking quantity, Q c i¸Q d
i .
(ii) The proof is by contradiction. Assume that Q c j¸Q d j for all j. We will use notation D sc i and D 
